Verbal communication leaves room for interpretative disputes. Speakers can argue about what they mean by their words and negotiate their commitments in conversation. This article examines the deniability of implicitly communicated contents and addresses the question of what makes an act of denial seem more or less plausible to the addressee. I argue that denials bring about a process of reconstruction of the context of interpretation of the speaker's utterance and I illustrate how considerations of cognitive utility are the key (...) determinant for distinguishing plausible from merely possible deniability. (shrink)

This book is a unique exploration of the idea of the "second person" in human interaction, the idea that face-to-face interactions involve a distinctive form of reciprocal mental state attributions that mediates their dynamical unfolding. Challenging the view of mental attribution as a sort of "theory of mind", Pérez and Gomila argue that the second person perspective of mental understanding is the conceptually, ontogenetically, and phylogenetically basic way of understanding mentality. Second person interaction provides the opportunity for the acquisition of (...) concepts of mental states of increasing complexity. The book reviews the growing interest in a variety of second person phenomena, both in development and in adulthood, presenting research that shows how participants in human interaction attribute psychological states of a referentially transparent kind to each other. This review documents the spontaneous preference for face-to-face interaction, from eye contact to joint attention, from forms of vitality to communicative intentions, from interaction detection to joint action, and from synchrony to interpersonal coordination. Also looking at the implications and applications of the second person perspective within fields as diverse as art and morality, this book is fascinating reading for students and academics in social and cognitive psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Huw Price’s widely read “Truth as Convenient Friction” overstates the onerousness, and underrates the utility, of the ontological commitments involved in Charles S. Peirce’s version of the pragmatist account of truth. This argument comes in three parts. First, I briefly explain Peirce’s view of truth, and relate it to his account of assertion. Next, I articulate what I take Price’s grievance against Peirce’s view to be, and suggest that this criticism misses the target. Finally, (...) I argue that Peirce’s version of the pragmatist account of truth has greater explanatory power than the narrowly linguistic version put forward by Price, such that even the ontology-averse should accept it. (shrink)

Evolutionary explanations for sexual behavior and orgasm most often posit facilitating reproduction as the primary function. Other reproductive benefits of sexual pleasure and orgasm such as improved bonding of parents have also been discussed but not thoroughly. Although sex is known to be highly reinforcing, behaviorist principles are rarely invoked alongside evolutionary psychology in order to account for human sexual and social behavior. In this paper, I will argue that intense sexual pleasure, especially orgasm, can be understood as a primary (...) reinforcer shaped by evolution to reinforce behavior that facilitates reproductive success. Next, I will describe an evolutionary account of social shaping. In particular, I will focus on how humans evolved to use orgasm and sexual arousal to shape the social behavior and emotional states of others through both classical and operant conditioning and through both reproductive and non-reprod... (shrink)

David Papineau’s Thinking About Consciousness tells a skillful, inventive, and plausible story about why, given that the phenomenal character of conscious experience is an unproblematically physical property, we continue to suffer from “intuitions of dualism”. According to Papineau, we are misled by the peculiar structure of the phenomenal concepts we use to introspect upon that phenomenal character. Roughly: unlike physical concepts, phenomenal concepts exemplify the kind of experience they are concepts of; and this creates the mistaken impression that the physical (...) concepts leave something out. I find much of Papineau’s account congenial, though I have some questions about his characterization of phenomenal concepts. I will take up two of these questions here. On Papineau’s view, phenomenal concepts are mental terms that are formed by concatenating an experience operator, namely ‘the experience: —’, together with “an actual state of… perceptual classification” (115). The latter state, itself an experience, fills the blank in the experience operator; and the concept thus formed refers to the type of experience whose instances are relevantly similar to that perceptual filling.1 Papineau writes. (shrink)

In this paper I shall carefully examine some recent arguments for dualism. These arguments presuppose a strong version of physicalism that I consider inappropriate. I shall try to show that, if we reformulate the thesis of physicalism according to Kim's view of physicalism (in terms of the supervenience relation), there is a third option, a version of type physicalism, where physicalism and quaiia could be conciliated. In order to sketch this option, I shall consider the main argument against type physicalism: (...) the explanatory gap argument, and two arguments that Kim mentions against physicalism: the inverted spectrum / zombies argument and the intrinsicality argument. I shall try to show that these three arguments depend upon a misconception of the nature of our ordinary mental concepts. (shrink)

In the article “A Proposal to Address NFL Club Doctors’ Conflicts of Interest and to Promote Player Trust,” Glenn Cohen et al. write, “The [NFL's] current structure forces club doctors to have obligations to two parties—the club and the player—and to make difficult judgments about when one party's interests must yield to another's.” I can understand why some might be suspicious about bias in the current NFL medical system, in which the club doctors have a professional duty to put their (...) player-patients’ best interests first yet are employed by clubs, which have a primary goal of winning football games. It is my opinion, however, that neither the club nor the player needs to be sacrificed. I base this opinion partly on my experience as an NFL player in the early 1980s, partly on several years as team physician for the Boston Red Sox, and partly on my twenty-three-years of experience as a physician with the Connecticut Workers’ Compensation medical system, which supposes that physicians can be fair to both workers and employers. (shrink)

The paper is a response to Davies, arguing that he misdiagnoses the difficulties with the architecturalist and externalist arguments he targets. Whether or not there are independent grounds for the principles limiting the transfer of epistemic warrant across known entailments, the problem with both types of argument is that they equivocate. It is shown that, in each case, if the premise I have mental property M, expresses something about which the subject is non‐empirically authoritative, it should be viewed as empty (...) of subtantial empirical content; whereas if premise If I have mental property M, then I meet condition C, expresses something knowable a priori, then since its consequent involves substantial empirical content, so must the antecedent. Hence, the modus ponens step is flawed because of equivocation. (shrink)

Rhetorical Structure Theory has enjoyed continuous attention since its origins in the 1980s. It has been applied, compared to other approaches, and also criticized in a number of areas in discourse analysis, theoretical linguistics, psycholinguistics, and computational linguistics. In this article, we review some of the discussions about the theory itself, especially addressing issues of the reliability of analyses and psychological validity, together with a discussion of the nature of text relations. We also propose areas for further research. A follow-up (...) article will discuss applications of the theory in various fields. (shrink)

Bluhm et al. (2023) identify invasiveness as a genus with multiple species: a treatment protocol or intervention can be invasive along physical, emotional, or lifestyle dimensions. They also identi...

Rhetorical Structure Theory is a theory of text organization that has led to areas of application beyond discourse analysis and text generation, its original goals. In this article, we review the most important applications in several areas: discourse analysis, theoretical linguistics, psycholinguistics, and computational linguistics. We also provide a list of resources useful for work within the RST framework. The present article is a complement to our review of the theoretical aspects of the theory.

ABSTRACT The aim of this article is to offer a reparative framework for current feminist approaches, most of which seek to inhabit rather than assimilate previous forms of inclusivity or intersectionality, by vindicating the pioneering role of past feminisms. For this purpose, I will stick to a double-edged methodological tool that has been an object of dispute in feminist and literary studies for the last decades, namely, critique and postcritique, two concepts that could be said to bear witness to old (...) and new ways of doing feminism. My aim is not to dismiss recent feminist work but to render visible forgotten critiques that have been an essential heritage of feminism. To acknowledge such debts is part of the reparative reading I present here, for I hold that the desire for deep knowledge is accretive and demands a closer and more respectful attention to past practices and theoretical positions. (shrink)

We present a corpus-based study of coherence in multimodal documents. We concern ourselves with the types of relationships between graphs and tables and the text of the document in which they appear. In order to understand and categorize the types of relations across modalities, we are making use of Rhetorical Structure Theory, and propose that this can adequately describe these types of relations. We analyzed a corpus comprising three different genres, and consisting of about 1500 pages of material and almost (...) 600 figures, tables and graphs. We show that figures stand in both presentational and subject matter relations to the text, and that the relationship between figures and text is one of a small set out of the larger possible rhetorical relations. We also discuss several issues that arise in the treatment of multimodal material, such as the potential for multiple connections between figure and text. (shrink)

An ongoing debate between ‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ theorists of personal autonomy addresses the following question: should agents have the final say on their own autonomy or should the objective circumstances in which agents live take prevalence when assessing their autonomy? Proceduralists favour the first strategy and substantive theorists restrict more explicitly the conditions under which autonomy is possible. I focus on forms of heteronomy which derive from oppressive circumstances and accept that substantive theorists are correct in contending that (i) forms (...) of oppression common in contemporary liberal societies (e.g. gender or racial oppression) tend to increase heteronomy; and (ii) the heteronomy which derives from social oppression tends to fly below the radar of procedural accounts. Still, I argue that a revised procedural strategy could limit these forms of heteronomy as long as it avoids the injunctions to ‘authenticity’ common in procedural models. I proceed by reconstructing John Christman’s model which, I argue, constitutes the most promising procedural account to assess autonomy under oppression. Christman’s theory, however, needs to be reinforced to ensure self-problematisation in light of a social perspective. I show that the latter is necessary to experience the forms of alienation which are markers of heteronomy according to Christman. (shrink)

Analytic philosophy was introduced in Latin America in the mid-twentieth century. Its development has been heterogeneous in different countries of the region but has today reached a considerable degree of maturity and originality, with a strong community working within the analytic tradition in Latin America. This entry describes the historical development of analytic philosophy in Latin America and offers some examples of original contributions by Latin American analytic philosophers.

J. David Velleman develops a canny, albeit mentalistic, theory of selfhood that furnishes some insights feminist philosophers should heed but that does not adequately heed some of the insights feminist philosophers have developed about the embodiment and relationality of the self. In my view, reflenvity cannot do the whole job of accounting for selfhood, for it rests on an unduly sharp distinction between reflexive loci of understanding and value, on the one hand, and embodiment and relationality, on the other. 1 (...) conclude that what is missing from Velleman's account is an appreciation of the psycho-corporeal attributes and capabilities embedded in the embodied self and the relational self. (shrink)

The continuing existence and operation of the traditional law of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples has – relatively recently – been explicitly acknowledged in Australian law. In emerging case law on the subject, the High Court of Australia has confirmed the common law recognition of the survival of Indigenous Australian law. However, in determining what it is that is recognized by the common law – in interpreting Indigenous Australian ‘traditional laws and customs’ – the High Court has disregarded the (...) knowledge reposed in those with authority or expertise in Indigenous Australian law, relying instead upon concepts and assumptions from the jurisprudence of English legal philosopher, HLA Hart. The influence of Hart’s theory in the Australian High Court’s interpretation of Indigenous Australian ‘traditional laws and customs’ is problematic, because it contains an obvious pre-legal–legal dualism reminiscent of the ‘state of nature’ – ‘civil society’ mechanism that was instrumental in the application of terra nullius to Australia. At the heart of The Concept of Law lies the notion of progression from a ‘primitive community’ with only primary rules, to an advanced legal system with a combination of both primary and secondary rules. In this article, I investigate how Indigenous Australians are positioned in relation to Hart’s pre-legal–legal dualism. I examine the ‘primitive’, pre-legal society in The Concept of Law, and its counterpart, the advanced legal system, to analyze the position of Indigenous Australian societies and law in Hart’s scheme. Finally, I analyze the construction of the dualism and consider its impact on the High Court’s interpretation of Indigenous Australian ‘traditional laws and customs’. (shrink)

El problema radica en la imprecisión del tipo de justicia adoptado en las Constituciones Políticas de América del Sur; tal ausencia genera que el sistema de justicia y la igualdad social sean implementados de forma inadecuada. La finalidad es proponer la aplicación de la justicia conmutativa en la administración de justicia y la justicia distributiva en la igualdad. La metodología utilizada es el enfoque cuantitativo, diseño transeccional, descriptivo. Los resultados presentan desacuerdo y desconfianza en el sistema de justicia y que (...) la falta de precisión del tipo de justicia genera incremento de la desigualdad social y crisis económica. (shrink)

J. David Velleman develops a canny, albeit mentalistic, theory of selfhood that furnishes some insights feminist philosophers should heed but that does not adequately heed some of the insights feminist philosophers have developed about the embodiment and relationality of the self. In my view, reflenvity cannot do the whole job of accounting for selfhood, for it rests on an unduly sharp distinction between reflexive loci of understanding and value, on the one hand, and embodiment and relationality, on the other. 1 (...) conclude that what is missing from Velleman's account is an appreciation of the psycho-corporeal attributes and capabilities embedded in the embodied self and the relational self. (shrink)

The Phenomenology of Spiritis the crowning point of several projects elaborated by Hegel between the years 1803-1807, and anticipates in some sense his Science ofLogic. The aim of this paper is to lay out some basic meditations about the origins of this work in connection with the courses of the Jena period, the possible conceptual tranformations of the Phenomenologyduring the time devoted to its writing, and its links with Hegel's posterior piece of work, the Science of Logic.

Amos is always ready to kill. Amos’ enemies are afraid of him for a good reason. For Amos killing people isn't much different from moving undesirable objects around. In this sense Amos places little value on human life and seems to lack morality. Amos’ antisocial behavior shows that he doesn't have a spontaneous emotional recognition of the value of others. Amos’ inability to feel what the person across from him feels, his general mistrust of people, and his difficulty in bonding (...) emotionally with others—these are all due to his past. In some ways Amos is actually a better person than most. His lack of emotion has upsides. Amos is not subject to panic or fear, and he's by far the most cool‐headed person on the Roci 's crew. (shrink)

Hegel reconoce en la “idealidad” de la mónada un antecedente necesario para la comprensión lógico-ontológica del “ser para sí” en el contexto de la superación de la oposición entre finito e infinito de la lógica del ser, a la vez que la anticipación de la formulación idealista del principio “la sustancialidad es subjetividad”. A los efectos de la comprobación de esta tesis el presente artículo comienza por las nociones de “representación” e “idealismo” a partir de las cuales Kant se permite (...) asociar la doctrina de Leibniz a un “dogmatismo metafísico”, dado que Hegel presupone su conocimiento. Para pasar en un segundo momento a la crítica posición de Hegel en torno a la “idealidad” de la mónada, en la que ésta se mide con el aporte de interpretaciones que el propio idealismo alemán –transcendental, primero, y subjetivo, después- fue generando. (shrink)

Se realizó la revisión bibliográfica con el objetivo de que los jóvenes profesionales de la salud conozcan acerca de la historia, origen y significado del distintivo que representa a la Medicina en todos sus campos con un carácter humanista y elevados valores éticos y morales: el emblema de Esculapio, al que se le atribuyen dotes para calmar o apaciguar. Esta imagen del bastón con la serpiente es la que ha quedado como un atributo del dios curativo y ha llegado hasta (...) la actualidad como símbolo de la Medicina. The literature review was made in order to young health professionals know about the history , origin and meaning of the emblem that represents the Medicine in all fields with humanist and high ethical values and moral character : the Aesculapius emblem, the feats attributed to him to calm or appease . This image of the snake with the cane has remained as a healing attribute of God and has come to the present as a symbol of medicine. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se analizará la representación del tiempo que bosqueja Hobbes en el Leviatán (1651) cuando se refiere al estado de naturaleza y al estado civil, teniendo en cuenta la relación entre el modo en que se dan las interacciones, las representaciones y el horizonte temporal de los individuos en cada caso. Asimismo, consideraremos ambas temporalidades en términos de rítmicas y las articularemos con la noción de desarrollo. La aproximación será filosófica pero incorporaremos en nuestro marco teórico herramientas (...) de la sociología y la antropología del tiempo, como las nociones de temporalidad, desarrollo y rítmica de Iparraguirre (2011, 2017) y la noción de horizonte temporal (Noyes, Boniecki), como aporte a los estudios hobbesianos. (shrink)

Abstract:This piece offers a reflection on James Liszka's book, Charles Peirece on Ethics, Esthetics, and the Normative Sciences. I consider Liszka's approach to Peirce's writings, especially the Minute Logic and "Evolutionary Love", and explore his extension of Peirce's ethical thought. I conclude that Liszka's work in this volume shows us what reasonableness as self-correction might require of us, and suggests ways in which we can take up the work of the normative sciences.

Nuestro trabajo se orienta a presentar lo desarrollado por Hegel sobre el pensamiento de Descartes en sus Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, teniendo en cuenta tres momentos: 1) la opción de Hegel por los Principios; 2) el lugar de Descartes en la “historia de la filosofía”; y 3) algunas conclusiones en torno a la tesis de que “avanzar en el pensamiento” sólo es posible en la medida en que uno reconozca a la historia de la filosofía no como una (...) “galería de opiniones” sino como una fuente inagotable de problemas y cuestiones. (shrink)